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Introduction
1.

Birth and growth, youth and maturity, senescence and death, frame--

if somewhat differently for males and females-- the life span
individual as a member of society.

of an

Demographic processes and structures,

while resting on a biological base,_ have far-reaching social irnpli-.
cations.

Fertility, growth, mortality, and the resulting sex and

age distributions of changing numbers, condit_ion the division of labor
in society and the sequential roles-- economic and social-- of the
demographically distinct groups.

Conversely, economic and social

processes and structures have far-reaching demographic consequences-
affecting fertility, family formation, and the life cycle of depen
dence, education, rnaturitypoccupation, and retirement.
2.

The economic growth process of a given historical epoch,

characterized usually by distinctive major sources of inc1'eased
capacity, must have specific effects on the demographic processes
c:.nd structu:r•es.

The~ effects a:,:,e associated

with the opportunit iec,

econo:nic and social, p:r.cvid<:!d by the epoch's sources of growth and
development, and with the requirements that the current material
and social technology imposes.

Modifications of the

basic demographic processes introduced by economic growth and social
development, then become the bases that condition the further stages
in the economic and social gPowth process .

.•.
~Prepared for Cnited Kations Symposiwn on Population and Development,
held in Cairo in June 1973.

-2-

3.

The discussion below concentrate s, for greater relevance,

on the interrelatio ns between modern economic growth as exemplified
by the process in the currently developed countries over the last
one and a half to two centuries, and the major trends in their demo
graphic processes. · But a similar interplay between population and
economic growth (including concomitant social development ) could
be traced for pre-modern stretches of history in the presently
developed countries, or for those regions of the world in the recent
past that have been relatively free of the impact of modern economic
growth.
Interrelatio ns between Fonulation Trends and Modern Economic Growth
4.

The major demographic trends observed in the developed

countries ( largely Europe, .the European offshoots overseas, and
Japan) over the long period since they entered modern economic growth
are familiar and do not call for lengthy discussion. 1
Of prime
importaiice was the marked reduction in mortality, which raised life

expectancy at birth fr•om forty years or below to close to seventy
years.

It had major Impacts on the mortality of infants and young

children, on the mortality (and associated morbidity) from infections
and related diseases, and

on mortality in the cities, which had

previously suffered from much higher death rates than the country
side.

This reduction in mortality was accompanied , but not simul

taneously, by a decline in fertility.

The crude birth rates declined

( in the older countries of Europe) from over· 30 pep 1,000 to well
below 20) a trend that larp;ely reflected intra-mc:iri tal fel'tility and
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was a res;;lt of decisions by the families to limit the number of
children.

It was not the result of any genetic changes, or of in

voluntary reaction by the human species to changes in the material
conditions associated with economic growth.

The combination of

low mor,tality 'n'i th low fertility-- while . still allowing for a much
greater long-term rate of natural increase than that over the pre
ceding centuries of higher birth and death rates-- was new and unique.
It had to be new because the opportunities for reducing the death
rates to the low levels attained were new and unparalleled in the past.
5.

The above comments may suggest both a close timing relation

between modern economic gr·owth and the downward ·trends in mortality
and fertility; and a distinction between the long-term trends in
mortality and fertility, in that the element of human choice and
decision

\•!as

absent in the former and of great importance in the

latter.

Neither suggestion is valid.

In many European com1tries

crude death rates declined .in the eighteenth century and wer·e i.n

the1r low 20' s by the second quarter of the nineteenth century--
pr~e:eding the initiation of modern econom1c growth by sevc:ral decades.
By con-'.:rast, in many countries there was no furthc::r decisive decl.1ne

of death ratf'!s ·,mtil late in the nineteenth century~ with most of
the reduction conc8ntrated in the CUX'l'8nt century-- severnl decades

a.ft er modern economic gr-o;;th was initiated.

Urban death rates were

substantially higher than rural even in the first decade of the!
twentieth century, in the European countries and in the Unit~d StG.t~s.
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Likewise, in the older European countries (but not in the United
States), fertility did not begin to decline until well into the last
quarter of the nineteenth centuryaa.- with a substantial lag after
the initiation of their modern economic growth.

Despite the con

nection betwee~ the delay in the decline of birth rates and the delay
in the decline of mortality (and the latter provides only a partial
explanation ), and despite the connection between the delay in the
decline of ffiortality and the effects of rapid urbanizatio n on the
aggregate death rate,; it still remains true that the timing of the
broad association between modern patterns of mortality and fertility
and modern economic growth, is not close.

The economic growth processes

undoubtedly provided opportuniti es for reducing mortality and raised
the ind_ucements and requirement s for lower fertility.

But the

opportuniti es were not so free of obstacles,n or the inducernents and
:r,equiremen ts so dominant in the early stages of the industriali zation
process, as to effect a prompt response in the demographic trends.
6.

Nor was a strong element of social, or even individual, de

cision absent from the prci):imate fa·ctors that made for the reduction
of mortality, and -for the delay in its decline in · the· nfoeteenth
centUl''Y.

Granted that for an individual, .the decision to postpone

d~ath is not usually a .m~tter of choice~ the views on mo~tality....:
.particularl y of .chiJ:d:hm-:_ changed -slowly".
death as

11

The acceptance ·of their -

usual" - or even ·as an offset tq the ''im]_X'o·vidence of the

· p.ooi'II persisted.
decision that- f:as

But - it_
Tr.Ol'C

was the _s-0ciaJly a:eter~foed implemented .

i..elling.

If -the reduction in- dea,:1:Ji-rates ·
- ~

before -wc-11'ld h'o.r II was due, as has recently been argued, to bettei..
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nutrition and living conditions, and to public health and sanitation
-

2

measures, far more than to advances in medical care and knowledge, .
the role of social decisions becomes patent.

The provision of means

of subsistence and of housing, of generally improved living conditions,
reflects policies on income distribution, prices of necessities,
housing and treatment of the poor.

Public health measures, involv-

ing political decisions on uses of funds and on regulation of the
private sector and of individuals, clearly rested on a social consensus
that was s1ow in coming. . A delay in the latter would have delayed
even further the decline in the urban, and hence aggregate, death
rates.

The long struggles of the public health reformers through

much of the nineteenth. century clearly indicate that even when the
sources of h1gh mortality wer·e known, much effort had to be expendE.d
to secure the soc~al decisions needed to reduce their impact.
7.

The opportunities and pressures produced by modern economic

growth led to decisions important in the reductions of the death
and crucial in the declines of the birth r•ates, and affected family

formation, location and migration, and the life cycle sequence of
education, occ,~pation, and retirement.

Fol"' a better unde1~standing

of these we note some distinctive fcatll.!'es of modern economic
growth.

The reference rr•ust perforce be b:;:,ief and simple.

But the

features are sufficient1y consr.>icuous a.nd pers:i.stent, c:nd many of
. ' .
.
d er-st,::11 d'ing. 3
· em amp 1 y d ocumente d , to mi1um1ze
m1sun
th
8.

First, the permissive basis for• tht! great rise in per

capita product, combined with high rates of population growth,

WctS
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the rapid increase in our tested knowledge of natural processes ,
applied to problems of productio n technolog y.

This increase took

the form of successiv e technolog ical innovatio ns, which in their
spread into mass use raised product and productiv ity.

They also

led to further knowledge concernin g the propertie s of nature and
to invention of additiona l tools, which facilitate d new discover ies-
and thus led to further applicati ons.

The re-enforc ing connectio ns

between discoveri es, invention s, innovatio ns, applicati ons, further
learning, more discovery , and so on, permitted the sustained pressure
toward higher productio n levels.

But the key link in this chain

was the mass applicati on of innovatio ns for wide use-- which meant
that knowledge was directed toward agreed-up on useful ends, among
which the provision of goods for ultimate consumpti on was paramoun t.
It was hardly an accident that innovatio ns relating to final con
sumption and consumer goods were just as prominent as those relating
to producer goods; and that the growth of consumpti on per capita
was almost as great as that of total product per capita.

This

orientati on of knowledge to useful ends and of productio n to ul
timate consumpti on obviously has bearing on mortality -- life and
health being prime consumpti on goods.

It also has bearing on

fertility , in that the orientati on toward greater consumpti on for
the existing and next generatio ns would, other condition s being equal,
lead to the choices of fewer children.

These implicati ons will become

clearer as we consider some other distincti ve features of modern
economic growth, closely connected with the one just noted.
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9.

~econd, a hiRh rate of growth of product per capita, fed

by successive technological innovations and their mass application,
was, perforce, accompanied by rapid changes in the production
structure of the country undergoing modern economic growth-- the
structure of the sectors in which the active economic members of the
population were engaged-- with consequent ch<:'-nges in the occupations
and the g~ographic location of these participants.

These rapid

changes in the country's production structure were partly due to
shifts in domestic demand r•eflecting different income elasticities
of demand for various goods; partly to the tendency of the focus
of innovations to shift from one sector to another, as the pot entials of economic advantage of new applications shifted ; and
partly to the effects of innovations in transport, communication
and the natural resource advantag~ among nations.

Industrialization-

the movement of output, capital, and labor shai'.'es from agriculture
to indµstry·~-== has been the 1nost prominent of these cl1anges in pro-

duction structure; but the shifts within the non-agricultural sector,
particularly of lc:.bo1., toward the service-

rather than commodity-

producing in6.ust1•ie::;, have been equally importi:t.nt.

One implication

of these rapid shifts in production st1~ucture for om.. theme is that

they widen the possibility of inter-generational bpeaks-- with sons
be:i.ng attached to industries, occupations, and locations different
from those of their fathers, to a far• greater extent than in a more
slowly changing, traditionals economy.

The effect on formation of

families and, in general, on the ties of authority of the o1dcr over

I·

t
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the younger generatio n, is obvj.ous • Moreover, it is re-enforc ed by
other aspects of this shift in productio n structure that have
markedly influence d populatio n trends.
10.

One of the two most relevant aspects is the sharp rise

in the proportio ns cf capital and labor engaged in large-sca le, non
personal enterpris es-- as contraste d with the decline in the propor
tions attached to small-sca le, personal, or family units.

The other

is the sharp rise in the education al and other skill requireme nts of
labor.

The rise in the size of the productiv e plant was associate d

with the economies of scale of modern technolog y.

These economies

were the results of technolog ical propertie s of new sources of in
dustrial power, of better controls over precision in fabricatio n
and of major improvem ents in intra-pla nt communic ation-- technolog ical
and social.

The growth of the large-sca le enterpris e (the economic,

not the productio n, unit)was also facilitate d by the revolutio nary
changes in communic ation, and by the organiza tional innovatio ns
feasible with a technolog y the rules of which could be overtly form
ulated and easily and widely communic ated-- impossibl e on the
basis of earlier personal master-ap prentice relations .

The require

ments for more for.nal education and greaters kills were partly a direct
consequen ce of the larger scale of productiv e units and enterpris es,
which demanded adequate communic ation and understan ding within the
organizat ion; partly a reflectio n of the increasin g reliance of
society on the productio n of new knowledge as a source of further
growth; and partly a result of the need for formal education as the
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basis for judging the equipment of would-be participants-- given
the system of recruitment into economic activity associated with
modern economic gro·r1th, to be touched upon below.

11.

The rapid shifts in production structure, the emergence

of large-scale production plants and economic enterprises, and the
rise in educational requirements of the economically active groups
in the population had striking effects on the location of population,
internal migration, family formation, and the typical life cycle of
an individual or- family unit.

Describing these population trends

as

consequences or corollaries of modern economic growth, or respon

ses

by individuals and families to changing opportunities and chang-

ing

conditions of exploiting these opportu.~ities associated

with economic growth, is partly a semantic problem.

The important

point is the coherence between the economic growth and the population
trends, a basis for evaluating the current situation in both developed
and developing countries.
12.

Indus::rializa~ion was associated with intensive mode1°n

urbanization because the former was accompanied by a rise in the
scale of the productive unit to a point where the econoi:iies of
scale demanded concentration of production and large bodies of wol'kers,
and induced the formation of new or la!'ger cities.

Even without

economies of scale, the movement away from agriculture would have
furthered url~anization:

the emergence of specialized crafts in the

Middle Ages led to some urbanization in the European countries~ even
though the scale of handicraft production and trade was relath·ely small.
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But it was primarily the rapidly rising scale of modern technology
and the successful resolution of the problems of communication and
organization that powered the movement toward the cities and their
rapid rate of growth in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, pari
passu with the accelerated rate of growth of product and population.
An additional, and key, permissive factor lay in the marked rise in
labor productivity in agriculture, which made it possible for a small
fi~action of the labor force (well below 10 percent in recent years) to
produce enough agricultural goods to satisy, at a high per capita
level, the other nine-tenths of the population.

The rapid movement,

suggested by these fractions, to high levels of urbanization, is
clearly a product of modern technology and economic growth -- much
of it in response to economic scales of production and enterprise.
And the recent emergence of dormitory suburbs in the developed in
dustrialized countries, an attempt at adjustment permitted by greater
affluence, only confirms the element of economic pressure, involved
. t h e urb anizatJ.on
.
'
. ear1·1er d eca d es. 4
1n
process in

13.

Given the parameters of modern economic growth, particularly

those of the growth of sectoral demand for labor, and the more
limited parameters of population growth, rapid urbanization and rapid
structural changes within the production system could not have occurred
without vast internal migration.

With modern economic growth character

ized by rapid structural changes, which imply wide differences in the
growth rates of the various parts of the structure, the disparities
between differential :rates of population increase and differential rates
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of growl~ of demand for labor are bound to become wide.

When the

deriiand for labor in some new industries grows between 5 and 10 per
cent per year, and that in the older industries located elsewhere
hardly gr-ows at all, the differential in natural increase rates cannot
accommodate itself to such disparities.

In addition, there was,

through most of the period, a higher rate o.f natural increase in the
countryside -- where additional employment opportunities were limited-
than in the cities, in which such opportunities grew more rapidly.
Urbanization reflected only the major disparities between rates of
natural increase and rates of gro~~h of employment opportunities,
and the internal migration implicit in it was only part of the
stream augmented by inter-city and inter-regional flows (in some
countries, the United States for example, immigi"'ation contributed
to the adjustment by its differential flm1 into those regions where
demand for labor was particularly active).

Such vast internal mi

gration and immigration is important for our theme.
ties between the par-ticipant

It broke the

in economic activity and his family

origins; it made the migrant more recepthre to econom:i.c opportunities;
it changed the conditions of life and work, with whatever' effects
they rnay have had on far.1ily formation and fertility; and it re
enforced the increasing sepa:::-iation between family and ec011omic ac
tivity, which has been a most important consequence of modern economic

growth.
14.

Migration only re-enforced the separation between the family

and economic activity that was impo~;ed by the increas,~ in scale of

-12'-

productio n and of the economic enterpris e.

Unlike a farm, a handi-

craft shop, a small store, or an individua l service activity, a
modern large-sca le plant cannot be contained within a household .
A large economic enterpris e, demanding large amounts of fixed capital
and with a perpetuat ing future not dependent on any one person's
or family's life, cannot be effective ly operated as a personal or
a family firm.

It demands an overt, imperson al, and effective

organizat ion in which the roles, responsi bilities, and privilege s
are explicitl y formulate d and legally enforceab le.

The control and

organizat ion of large-sca le productio n demand that it be separated
from the household .

The individua l participa nts must perform their

tasks within the plant or the office, away from their families and
household s.

They thus become members of a group whose practices

and disciplin e have only limited contact with the life of the in
dividual participa nt as a member of a household or a family.
a result, a large vol~~e of economic activity

As

formerly carried on

within the household s of traditona l farmers, craftsmen , shopkeep ers,
etc. has been removed from family activity.

Moreover, the function

of the family as an institutio n transmitt ing economic experienc e and
skills from one generatio n to the next has been severely limited.
And while the process began with the removal of market-o riented ac
tivities from most families, it was followed by mechaniz ation of house
hold services, by professio nalizatio n and hence removal from the
family of many education al services, and by the shift out of the
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family and into the organized labor markets of an increasin g propor
tion of domestic labor resources that previousl y had provided services
within the family.

15.

The removal of the full-time economic activity from the family

and household and the resulting separ-atio n between the productio n
plant and the home

were accompani ed) and eventuall y re-enforc ed,

by the revolutio nary changes in the practice and criteria of recruitme nt
of individua ls into econom-ic activity.

Given the large scale of the

modern plant and enterpris e, the large numbers of active participants involved, and the migrant origin of much of the available
labor, it was impossibl e to recruit on the basis of personal knowledge
of candidate s and their family 01'igins (although this approach was
followed in the recrui trnent of unskilled immigrant s th1,ough the
ethnic compatrio t boss system in some early phases of U.S. growth).
Furthermo re, the requireme nts of rising education and other skills
to handle effecti·ve ly rather complex productio n tasks involving cost-

ly capital equipmen t) made personal knowledge of an applicant far less
important than knowledge of h:i.s testable equipmen t, whether it

wa.s

manual dexterity , ability to relate to people, o:r general or pro
fessional formal education .

The large numbers and t'he large eco

nomic magnitude s involved in ac.eguate resolutio n of recruitin g a.nd
staffing problems warranted a concertP.d and prolonged effort to de
velop an effective classific ation of the productio n tasks within the
plant and enterpris e, and to formulate criteria of satisfact ory se
lection.

Tl1ese were bound to repJ.ace tl1e tradition al type of

l-

1
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recruitme nt based on personal knowledge of workers and of their
family anteceden ts.

The shift from recruitme nt on the basis of

status, closely connected with family origins and warranted in
earlier times by lack of better ways for judging the suitabili ty of
individua ls fnr their economic tasks, to recruitme nt on the basis of a
person's objective ly tested capacity for performan ce, specifica lly
formulate d to a well defined range of productio n tasks, was a revol~
tionary change in the moderniz ation of society in adjustmen t to
modern economic growth.

And it had far-reach ing effects on popu

lation and the life cycle of its members.

Economic activity and pre

paration for it occupy much of the life of an individua l, from child
hood through maturity; and major changes in condition s of entry, and
implicitl y in the criteria for rise within the economic system, that
occurred in the shift in recruitme nt, were bound to have multiple and
far-reach ing consequen ces.
16.

One immediate consequen ce was the rise in the level of

formal education and the spread of formal certifica tion.

The edu

cational system became increasin gly involved in screening individua ls,
and in channelin g them to more advanced levels roughly on the basis
of ability-- even if qualified by parental position and by surviving
patterns of discrimin ation.

A growing proportio n of the labor force

underwent longer periods of general and professio nal training, which
was supplemen ted at later stages of the occupatio nal career.

/',nd

a rapidly increasin g share of economic positions was contingen t upon
fonmal certifica tion, with respect either to education al levels attained
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or to specialized skills , or to both.

Thus, the trend within

labor force away from entrepreneurial and self-employment to em
ployment status

was accompanied by the trends to higher levels of

formal and specialized education, professionalization of occupations,
and an extension of certification.

For our theme, the main bearing

of these trends is the increased investment in human (as distinct
from material) capital, prolongation of the period of education that
kept the younger generation out of both economic and household ac
tivity, in separate schools; and thus contributed further to the

shift of the transmission of knowledge and experience between
generations from the family and household to the non-family, non
personal institutions.
17.

The distinctive characteristics of modern economic growth

noted above -- rapid cha~ges in production structm,e, urbanization
and vast internal migration (and immigration), the shifts of requirements and conditions of participation in economic activity and
the associated increase of emphasis c,n education and training,
and testable criteria of individual performance-- all had profound
influences on fertility, family formation, and the life cycle of
learning, work,and retirement. These influences were not limited
to the urban populations whose proportions in the total were rapidly
growing.

They extended also to the rural populations that were

sending many of their younger gene:ration to the cities and the con
ditions of whose life were also thoroughly affected by the higher
educational and other requirements of r:1odern economic F,rowth.

ln
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fact, the declin es in rural fertil ity in a countr y like the
United
States were, at least before World War II, relati vely as great
as
those for urban fertil ity -- althou gh the differ ential s tended
to
persis t.
18.

The declin e in birth rates was clearl y associ ated with

the greatl y increa sed costs of childr en, result ing partly from
the
withdr awal of their labor from the family milieu , and partly
from
the requir ement for a longer and more expen sive span of educa
tion
and traini ng.

Both of these costs were direct ly connec ted with the

rearin g of the next genera tion to econom ic matur ity and with
the
upward mobil ity of the paren tal genera tion itself .

These trends

toward greate r costli ness of childr en were re-enf orced by the
shift
to urban life, and the compe titive pressu res of a rising standa
rd
of consum ption, in the cities and in the count ryside .

The result ing

declin e in the size of the family was re-enf orced by the separa
tion of gener ations .

'

Cor·re spondi ngly, a trend develo ped toward the

conjug al (or nuclea r) family , charac terize d by"the relati ve
exclus ion
of a wide range of affina l and blood relati ves from its everyd
ay
affair s, 11 and·e ffecti vly limite d to paren ts and their childr
en largel y
below the adult ages, and free from more extend ed family ties
in the
choice of mates .in the proces s of family forma tion and in the
choice
5
of locati on.
And, too, the life cycle of learni ng, work , and re
tireme nt change d marke dly.

The age of entry into the labor force in

the develo ped count ries rose substc =mtial ly, assoc iated largel
y with
the prolon gation of the period of formal educa tion; and the
age of
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retirement from full-time economic activity dropped sharply, reflected
the more widespread employee status combined with the increased ob
solescence of human skills and facilitated by institutional provisions
for supporting the retired population.

Since all these demographic

trends can be viewed as responses, in a greater or less degree, to
the requirements for effective and productive economic activity
under the shifting conditions of modern economic growth, when realized,
they contributed significantly to the high growth rates of the
developed countries.

It

is difficult to envisage modern economic

growth without the reduced birth rates, the greater investment in
human capital represented by education and training, the smaller
family, and the concentration of the labor force in the prime ages
between the late entry and early retirement.
19.

The condensed summary of the interrelations between popula-

tion trends and modern economic growth must be concluded with a
brief reference to four major qualifications.

They are reminders

of omissions to be kept in mind in evaluating the bearing of the past
interrelations on the present and future.
20.

First, the coherence betwE>en the opportunities and pequire

ments of modern economic growth and the response of the population
trends should not be viewed as an easy and smooth pPocess, character
ized by close timing and a relatively close relation hetween the
economic and demographic para'Tleters.

The movement away from agri

culture should not be viewed only as a response of labor to gr·eater
opportunities in industry and the cities; it could just as well have
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been the result of the push from the countryside produced

by a

shrinking market for agricultural products combined with advanced
agricultural technology and institutions that displaced farm labor.
The rapid changes in production structure stressed above meant not
only greater opportunities in the rapidly growing sectors but also
declining opportunities and technological unemployment in the slowly
growing sectors; and the adjustment was never a simple and prompt
transfer of displaced resources.

And, as already indicated, the

decline of both death and birth rates lagged for decades behind
industrializati on in many currently developed countries.

In other

words, much of modern economic growth took place before

the modern

demographic patter'Ils emerged; also,before the wide spread of literacy
and education.

The process was long, with leads and lags, and

disparities in adjustment;

and like all processes of change in

economic and social performance and institutions, it was subject to
distortions and changes in pace.

Thus, the demographic patter·ns that

developed were

in with economic growth.

not closely tied

While,

in general, birth and death rates are lower in the developed than in
the developing countries, within the group of developed countries
general indexes like per capita product, and birth and death rates,
are not closely associated.
21, Second, the duration of the processes the interrelations

of which are our theme, is partly due to the gradual spread, parti
cularly of population trends, amonR the different social and economic
groups within a developed country.

The economic and social differentiaJs

among birth and death rates could not be considered in our hrief
sumrna:t'Y; but it is clear that the transition to lower birth and
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death rates, in response to greater opportunities provided by economic
growth, could not occur simultaneously and at the same rate for all
economic and social eroups.

6

Some of the trends in the differential

aspects of death and birth rates have significant bearing on changing
inequalities ir. economic position and material welfare.

At least

the older cow1tries (as distinct from the European offshoots overseas)
may have experienced for a while a widening of the economic and
social differentials in fertility, with possible widening of in
equality in size distl,,ibution of i.ncome.

But this topic requires

more intensive study than is feasible here; and is mentioned only
because of its possible bearing on the prospects in d~veloping
countries, once their transition to lower fertility levels begins.
22.

Third, modern economic growth spread gradually and began

at different dates in the currently.developed countries-- these
dates (rough approximations only) ranging n"om the late eighteenth
century in the pioneering England, to the 1840 1 s for several European
countries and the United States, to the 1880 1 s in Japan, and to the
1930's for the USSR (after-an initial spurt in Russia in the 1890 1 s).
The international aspects of modern economic g1'owth could not be
cover•ed in this su.111mary.

Yet, needless -to say, they affected popu

lation trends -- not'only through international migration, which
was particularly open and responsive~ for the European countries of
origin, during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but
also through the international demonstration effect of the declines
in death and birth rates.

The innovations in economic and social

policies, and later in hcaJ.th tec.hnoJ.oe,y, made in the pionee:r.
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countries , could spread to others, at lesser cost and input than
required by the pioneers -- just as the economic advance of the pioneer
developed countries could be followed, at lesser cost, by other
countries that were sufficien tly prepared to take advantage of the
opportun ities.

The reduction in birth rates and the shift to the

conjugal family, once emerged in the pioneer developed country,
could become readily known and even adopted as a desirable model by
a growing segment of the populatio n in the follower countries .
23.

Fourth and last,the interrela tions between economic growth

and populatio n trends are, as already indicated , only part of the
network of factors determini ng demograph ic patterns; and, more
relevant here, the connectio ns between economic growth and populatio n
trends are not only direct but operate through what, from one stand
point, may be viewed as intermedi ate variables .

Yet each of the latter

may have a life and effect of its own, both on populatio n and on
economic growth.

To illustrat e:

modern economic growth has been

associate d with the increasin g importanc e of the national sovereign
state, which serves as the arbiter of conflicts generated by rapid
economic growth, as the referee of the social and legal innovatio ns
stimulate d by the latter, and as the regulator of any difficuli ties
stemming from the conflict between private and social interests in
a complex market economy.

The existence of this effective poli.tical

and social institutio n meant that policies relating to both mortality
and fertility could be adopted that would not have been possible
otherwise .

Another illustrat ion:

the greater urbanizat ion, the
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formation of large cities, created a condition of anonymity among
the inhabitants that was unknown
surrounding s.

in the rural and small town

This condition -- a direct result of urbanizatio n,

not of economic processes -- affected the consumption and living
patterns and family formation pattern5.

Or consider the effects

of the power of science and tested knowledge on the diminution of
authoritari an religious belief, and hence on the teaching of Peligious
institution s and doctrine regarding life and death.

In this case,

modern economic growth affects ideology indirectly through the demon
stration of the power bestowed on man by tested knowledge that accepts
no authority except that of observation , experiment, and the canons
of scientific inference.

In short, both economic growth and modern

population trends are parts of the whole modernizati on process that oc
curred

in the developed countries over the last one and a half to

two centuries; and the two have inter-acted not only directly, but
also via other institution al and ideological variables.
Bearing on Current Problems
24.

The bearing of the preceding discussion on current problems

can be put in general terms.

Modern economic growth has provided

opportuniti es for a great reduction in death rates

and inducements

and requirement s for a marked reduction in birth rates; f01, a small,
mobile family unit; and for a great change in the life cycle of
education, occupation, and retirement.

But with successive innovations

and the rapid structural changes ,.mce;:•lying the high aggregate rate
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of modern growth, the respons e to opportu nities and the adjustm ent
to displace ment and changing requirem ents was neither prompt nor
smooth, if only because of technol ogical unemplo yment, and a push
toward migratio n even before the pull became dominan t.

Differe ntials

in birth rates, death rates, and migratio n may have increase d in
equality .in the distribu tion of income before institut ional adjust
ments produced a shift toward equality ; and, as exempli fied by ecolog
ical and other correla tes, all the demogra phic consequ ences of
modern economic growth could not be easily forecas t
if found undesir able,

or

foresta lled

Current social problem s,.that ispcurre nt

developm ents that seem socially undesira ble and call for remedia l
policy action, are largely the results of past growth, in which unforeseen

consequ ences of past desirab le attainm ents have grown to

dimensio ns sufficie nt to demand attentio n.
social problem is thus a

Recogni tion of a current

judgmen t, in terms of accepted criteria

(which may change over time), of undesira ble consequ ences of some
past positive achievem ent.

Of course, a current problem that

originat ed in past positive achievem ent is still a problem calling
for action, but relating it to its origin places it in the proper
perspec tive and within a fairly wide group of similar problem s that
may have been overcom e.

And the ways in which the latter have been

resolved deserve scrutiny , imitatio n, or rejectio n.
25.

Conside r as an illustra tion -- all that is feasible here-

a conspicu ous current problem , the high rate of populati on growth in
the less develope d countri es.

That rate puts an increasi nf, burden
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on economic capacity and makes it increasingly difficult to raise
the level of per capita product, to better the internal distribution
of income, and to accumulate sufficient reserves to escape any
adverse effects of unavoidable fluctuations
and of other uncertainties.

(in weather and c1•ops)

According to recent estimates, in the

less developed regions (Asia excluding Japan, Africa, Latin America
excluding the Temperate subgroup,Ocean ia excluding Australia and
New Zealand), which in 1750 accounted for• two-thir·ds of world
population, crude birth rates between 1750 to 1920 averaged slightly
over 40 per 1,000; crude death rates averaged slightly over 36 per
1,000; &nd the rate of natural increase was barely 4 per 1,000.

7

This rate of natural increase was well below that for the developed
regions, which rose from 4 per 1,000 in 1750-1800 to 9 in 1850-1900,
and to 13 in 19CC-1910.

Then, for the three decades, 1920-1950,

the death rates in the less developed regions declined to al,out 30
per 1,000, while birth rates remained somewhat above 40, which meant
that the rate of natural increase almost tripled to 11 per 1,000,
about the same level as for the developed ~egions in decades free
of world wars

Ol'

"great n depressions.

after World Wai, II.

But the striking change ca..-ne

The <lea.th rate in the less developed regions,

which stood at 28 per 1,000 in 1940-1950, dropped to 22 in 1950-60,
to 19 in 1960-65, and to 15 in 1965-70, wl1ile the crude birth rate
moved from 40 per 1,000 in 1940-50 to 1}3 in 1950-60, to 42 in 1960-65
and to 40-1/2

in 1965-70.

sequently rose f-roy;1 12 in

Th~ crude rate of natm~al increase, con
1940-50 to 2 14 in l9E,0-65, and to 21+-1/2
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in 1965-7 0.

Such a rate of increa se, about 2.5 percen t per year,

was observ ed in the past only in the few excep tional develo ped
count ries
(such as the Un:~ted States before late ninete enth centur y) that
attrac ted large immig ration and could take advan tage of an abunda
nce
of natura l resou rces; and it was over twice as high as the longterm rates of pcpula tion growth in the older develo ped count
ries
of Europe and in Japan.
26.

The presen t medium projec tions assume that these crude

rates of natura l increa se in the less develo ped region s will
rise
from 24-1/2 per 1,000 in 1965-7 0 to 25 in 1970-8 0.

While this rise

seems sligh t, even the contin uation of the high growth rate
decade poses a ch0.lle nging proble m.

for anothe r

The implic ations of the pro

jectio n ·are even grave r when we distin guish betwee n the East
Asia
region (domin ated by Mainla nd China ), which accoun ted in 1960
for
645 millio n out of a total of 692), and the others (with
a popul ation

of 1,315 millio n in 1960). This distin ction is impor tant

becaus e

of the major diffe1° ences in social and politi cal struct
ure betwee n

Mainla nd China and other less develo ped region s

and becaus e of the

scarci ty of basic data and the tenuou sness of both curren t
estima tes
and projec tions for the former .

If we combin e the remain ing less

develo ped region s (exclu ding the neglig ible group in Ocean
ia), the
crude birth rate moves from 46 per 1,000 in 1950-6 0 to 45 in
1960-6 5,
to 44 in 1965-7 0, and is projec ted to 42 1/2 in 1970-8 0 -while
the death rate drops over the four period s fr•orr, 24 to 20 to
17, and
is projec ted to 13-1/2 .

The rate of natur al increa se rises from 22-1/2
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to 25~1/2 to 27-1/2, and is then projected to the record level of
29 per 1,000 in 1970-80.

That such a growth rate of population

in the less developed regions, which account for about four-tenths of
the world population, constitutes a major problem -- if improvement
in material welfare is to be attained -- can hardly be gainsaid.
For both the high birth rates and the low death rates there is ample
parallel in the past.

But there is no historical parallel for this

combination of high birth rates with low death rates, especially for
countries that are at the lower levels of current economic performance
per head; nor is there parallel, in the history of modern economic
growth, to such rapid declines in death rates (except _in the few
years of recovery after epidemics).
27.

In the light of the preceding discussion, it is obvious

that the problem is associated with the rapid decline in the death
rates -- a positive attainment, made possible in large part by modern
economic growth.

The high level of technologic al capacity in

production as well as in the medical arts, the ability to establish
rapid communicati on with, and penetration into, the economicall y
less developed world, and the basic philosophy of the value of
material welfare and of health, all contributed to this achivement.
Although obvious, this comment needs to be made in order to stress
that the problem originated in the effective spread of a major
positive contributio n.

To be sure, the difficultie s could have

been avoided by an equally prompt response of birth rates.

But the

slowness of the adjustment should not blind us to the magnitude
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of the positi ve attain ment, realiz ed and projec ted.

And it can be

argued that such a declin e in death is an indisp ensabl e pre
requi site for modern econom ic p,rowth ; and that it is also a
pre
requi site for the declin e in birth rates, in so far as they
are
determ ined by a given surviv ing size of family desire d by the
paren tal ienera tion.
28. The second comment stems from our discus sion of the conne
ction betwee n modern econom ic growth and the declin e in birth
rates
in the develo ped count ries.

We stress ed the change d induce ments

and requir ement s of the modern economy that made fewer childr
en, with
greate r invest ment in their educa tion and traini ng, and a small
er
family , more attrac tive;a nd sugge sted that, in gener al, econom
ic
growth and moder nizatio n remove d the need for a large family
by
shifti ng many of its econom ic, educa tional , and protec tive
functi ons
to impers onal busine ss or public enterp rise, educa tional institution s, and the state.

These institu tional -chan ge-co rollar ies of

modern econom ic growth , compo nents in the genera l moder nizatio
n
proce ss, took: time to evolve , and the declin e in birth rates
was
both delaye d and drawn out-- partic ularly in the count ries
that
entere d modern econom ic growth first.

The releva nt questi on here for

the less develo ped region s of today is wheth er the econom ic,
politi cal,
and socia l instit ution s have been restru ctured , and the ideolo
gical
views of societ y change d, to place empha sis on greate r invest
ment in
fewer childr en, to pr·ovid e politi cal and social stabil ity combin
ed
with intern al social mobil ity that would enhanc e the intere
st of the
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parental generation in smaller families.
29.

An answer to this question demands more knowledge of the

changing social and political institutions of the less developed
regions than is at hand.

The temptation to give a negative answer

is great, but is not fully valid.

Modernization has been initiated

and substantial reduction in birth rates. has been realized in several
less developed cow1tries.

Yet, to point up the difficulties in

establishing political stability, we need only mention the internal
conflicts in such major countries of Asia as Pakistan, Indonesia,
and the Philippines, and of subSaharan Africa as the Congo, Nigeria,
and Ghana, and the spread of military dictatorships i~ much of Latin
American and other less developed regions.

The absence of political

stability makes it impossible to generate a restructuring of economic
and social institutions, which are often likely to sharpen the con
flict betw~en traditional and modern interests.

The comment is made,

despite limitations in our- knowledge, in order to emphasize the
connection between declines in birth rates and the necessary trans
formation of economic and social institutions that would assure
the interest of the parental generation in fewer children and in
greater investment in human capital.
that provides no rewards for fewer.

A social and economic structure
children, with slight prospect of

a better future for· them and their parents, would scarcely encourage
low birth rates.

This is not to minimize the effects of recent

improvements in the technology of birth control in response to the
recognition of a rno1'e acute need fop them, nor of relevant chanp;es
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in public attitude s and governm ental policies -- all of which may
be needed to impleme nt fully the interes t in smaller families once
it is establis hed.
rates require an

However , far-reac hing reductio ns in birth
economi c and social milieu that would not reward

reliance on a genetic lottery , i.e. on a large number of survivin g
children , for lack of assuranc e that greater inv~strn ent in fewer
numbers would yield appreci able benefit s-- to the parenta l and to
the younger generat ion.
30.

Third, once birth rates begin to drop in the develop ing

countrie s, the reductio n is likely to be evident first among some
groups, usually those in the modern advanced types of profess ional
and modern occupat ions and those in the upper.in come bracket s; and
will only later spread to the more traditio nal, and lower income,
occupat ions.

It may, therefo re, for a_ time, have the effect of

maintai ning, or even widenin g, the already wide inequal ities in
income.

The pressure s on nationa l unity and on toleranc e of con

tinuing inequal ities, of failure of signific ant benefit from whateve r
economi c growth takes place, are thus li'.~ely to become great
particu larly because the spread of economic growth to the less
develope d regions is accompa nied by the spread of modern views on
the presump tive power of modern technolo gy to bestow materia l ben
efits on all humanit y, and the demonst ration effects of widespr ead
high standard s of consump tion elsewhe re.

This means that, with

respect to populat ion, the develop ing societie s must take account not

-29-

only of the over-all difficulty of raising aggregate income per
capita when the total rate of population growth is so high, but also
of the need to change the economic and social conditions of the large
population groups at the lower rungs of the economic ladder to assure
their interest in fewer children and smaller families.
31.

This suggests the fourth and most general comment on the

problem under consideration, in the light of our earlier discussion
of interrelations between population growth and modern economic
growth in their -historical perspective.

The adjustment that has to

be made to the rapid decline in the death rates in the less developed
countries is much greater and more pressing in many important
respects

than were the similar adjustments of the birth rates in

the developed countries in the past.

Not only is the current growth

rate of population in the less developed regions so much higher than
that of the older developed countries in their long-term past.

Not only

are the economic levels and reserves of the less developed regions
so much lower than those of most currently developed countries in
their pre-modern past.

Not only may the tolerance of economic de

privation and inequalities have been lowered with the spread of
modern economic growth and modern views on the importance of equality
of economic opportunity and
b2nefit for all groups.

on assurance of a minimum of material

There is also a greater awereness of the

connections bet1-1een demographic trends and the conditions of economic
advance in the ap;e of modern technology and modern economic p;rowth;
and cf the role that can be played by a more enlirhtencd policy than
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the laissez -naire and pro-na talist policy which prevail ed in the
curren tly develop ed countr ies in the past.
32.

The above comment should not be interpr eted to mean that

no econom ic advance would be possib le in the less develop ed region s
of today, withou t strikin g reducti ons in birth rates.

After all,

despite the high growth rates of popula tion, per capita produc t
of the less develop ed econom ies grew over the 1950's and 1960's
at a rate of about 1 1/2 percen t per year (after all adjustm ents), which
meant a rise over the two decades of about a third. 8 But while
this record looks good in compar ison with the past, it is far short
of that shown by the develop ed econom ies over the period .

More import 

ant, it raises questio ns as to whethe r such a gain can be mainta ined
with contin uation , and indeed the projec ted accele ration, in the
rate of popula tion gr0wth .

Whatev er the answer , the histor ical

perspe ctive sugges ts that a more delibe rate popula tion policy might
consid er not only the spread of knowled ge of birth contro l techno logy,
but also the ways in which the given institu tional framew ork affects
incenti ves on the part of a large propor tion of people to shift
toward greate r investm ent in human capita l and fewer childre n.

This

means explori ng change s in econom ic, politi cal, and social institu tions
that would enhanc e the intere st of an increas ing propor tion of the
popula tion in the modern type of family -- given the attainm ent of
death rates low enough to approx imate modern levels .
33.

As indicat ed above, the comments on the curren t problem

of high rates of popula tion Rrowth in the less develop ed countr ies

'
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are illustrative.

Moreintensive consideration was impossible,

partly for lack of knowledge and partly for lack of space.

In

general, inferences from the past for the present and the future
can only be suggestive.

We could have illustrated the relevance

of the historical perspective to the problems of demographic ad
justment in the developed countries -- which are, however, quite
different in range and emphasis from those stressed for the current
problem for the less developed regions.
so here.

It was not feasible to do

Yet I would like to conclude by stressing the differences

in the specific implications of the population adjustment problems
between the developed and less developed regions , which are marked
as are those even among some subregions within each of the two
groups.

This means that the historical perspective would have to

be translated into rather different implications for the two groups
of countries, or for some subregions within each.

Thus, although

we are all inhabitants of one planet and members of world humanity,
the population problems of the various regions are rather different.
This has its favorable aspects, in that we are not all caught in
the same bind that constrains many less developed countries, and
resources can be transferred.

But it also has its unfavorable

aspects, in the sense that our interests and concern differ.

But

regardless of the implications for policy, in order to achieve better
understanding, our interpretation 0f the historic~]. perspective must
be geared to the different problems of the several societies and regions.
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And the very analy sis of what we can learn froin the past must
be
refine d and tested , if it is to serve as a basis for more intel
ligent treatm ent of curren t popul ation proble ms.

Footnotes

1 rhe Slli11mary of population trends presented is.clearly selective,
and cannot be viewed as an adequate survey. In additon to many
United Nations sources, ranging from the 1953 report on The Determ
inants 2nd Ccnseouences of Population Trends, to the two major
Population Ec11.letins no. 6, 1962 (on mortality) and no. 7, 1963
(on fertility), to the background papers,prepared for the 1965
Wor•ld Population Conference, on mortality (by C. C. Spicer) and on
fer·tility (liy George W. Roberts), and to the most recent Population
Studies no. 1+7, The b'~d Population Shuat'ion in 1970, New York,
1971. I found p-articula:cly helpful the summary by D.V. Glass and
r. Grebenik, "World Population, 1800--1950," Chapter II in H.J.
Habakkuk and M. Postan, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of
Europe, volume VI, pp. 60-138 (Cambridge University Press, 1965).
2

See T. McKeown, R.G. Brown, and R.G. Record, "An Interpretation of the Modern Rise of Population in Eur·ope, 11 Population
Studies, vol. 26,no. 3, November 1972, pp. 345-382; and on public
health in Great Britain,rr.ost of the issue of Population Studies
March 1964 (vol. 17, no. 3).
')

~·For a summary of the characteristics of modern economic
growth see my Nobel Memorial lecture, "Modern Economic Growth:
Findings and Reflections, 11 in Les Prix Nobel en 1971 (Stockholm,
1972), pp. 313-32 (repr•inted in American Economi~view, June 1973).
A more detailed discussion is given in the earlier monographs,
Modern Economic G:r owth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, Yale Univers{ty
Press, New Haven, 1956, and Economic Growth of nations: To'.::a.l Outnut
and Production Structure, Harvard University Press, Cambridre, Mass. 197;.
0

4

For a summary of data. on urbanization and discussion of
concepts see United Nations, Growth of the World's U:rhan and Rural
Population, 1920--2000, New York, 1969, and the references there
io historicaJ. studies~ Current worldwide data on the structure
of labor force by sectoral attachment can be found in International
Labour Office, L2..½our Force Projections, 1965-1985, Parts I-V,
Geneva, 1971. Histor·ical d2ta on in<lust1;ial attachment of laboP
force are given in P. Bairoch and others, The \forking Population
and Its Structure, Inst i tut de SocioJ.ogie, Uni versi te· Libre d8
Bruxelles, Brussels, 1968.
5

The term 11 conjup;al 11 and the quotation tire from William J.
Goode, ~:orld Pevolution and family Patterns (New York, The Free Pre~:s,
1963), p. 8. Thi::.; monof,r-a"jJh presents an intercstinr; analys:i '.;
of tLe ci:mju_2:al family as an "ideal type" concept, toward wki.ch
the cv0lut3 0:1 of family in modern times tended to converp:e.

6

.

A recent surrm.:iry is given 1y Gwendolyn Z. Johnson in
"Differenti al FertiJ.ity in European Countries," in Ansley J. Coale,
ed., Demov.raDhic ar::d I:conomic Change in Developed Countries (Princeton,
Princetcn University Press for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1960), pp. 36-76.
7

These and other estimates below are from United Nations,
The World Population Situation in 1970, New Yo1"'k, 1971, a highly
useful 1~eview of current trends that includes a brJcf summar•y of
historical antecedents . But the "medium" projection that it
presents may already be seen to underestima te the decline in birth
rates in the late 1960's in North America and in the U.S.S.R.,
differing in this respect from the projections for the less devel
oped regions. It thus appears that the contrast in the growth
rates of population in the near future between the developed a:1d
the less developed regions may be even wider than that shown by
the projections in this UN report.
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in my paper, "Problems in Comparing Recent Growth Rates for• DPvel-·
oped and Less D0veloped Countries," Economic De,•elopr::ent 2nd
Cultural Chan£'E:, vol. '20, no. 2, January ic:/72, pp. 185-209. A
more recent discussion is summarized in l1Postwar Growth of L.ess
Develop~d Countries," prepared for the R~hovot Conference scheduJed
for September 1973 in fora.el.

